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Abstract
The emergence of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus in humans and subsequent discovery that it was of swine
influenza virus lineages raised concern over the safety of pork. Pigs experimentally infected with pandemic 2009 H1N1
influenza A virus developed respiratory disease; however, there was no evidence for systemic disease to suggest that pork
from pigs infected with H1N1 influenza would contain infectious virus. These findings support the WHO recommendation
that pork harvested from pandemic influenza A H1N1 infected swine is safe to consume when following standard meat
hygiene practices.
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Introduction
The emergence of the pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza A virus in
humans and subsequent discovery that it was of swine influenza
virus lineages [1] raised many questions about this novel virus. One
such concern relates to food safety, if swine were to become infected
withthe pandemic virus would the meat be contaminatedwithvirus
and be a potential source of human infection? To address this
question we tested non-respiratory tract tissues for virus following
infection of young pigs with the pandemic H1N1 2009 virus.
Materials and Methods
A total of 30 pigs were inoculated with A/CA/04/2009
(H1N1)v (n=15 pigs) or A/Mexico/4108/2009 (H1N1)v (n=15
pigs) as part of ongoing studies to determine the susceptibility of
swine to the human virus (Vincent, unpublished). The animals
were housed according to the National Animal Disease Center
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee guidelines. Five
pigs from each virus challenge group were euthanized on 3, 5, and
7 days post infection (dpi). All pigs were treated similarly receiving
an intratracheal challenge with 2610
5 50% tissue culture
infectious dose (TCID50) as previously described [2]. Postmortem
samples including serum, lung, tonsil, liver, kidney, spleen,
inguinal lymph node, colon contents (feces), and skeletal muscle
from the semitendinosus were collected at necropsy using individual
sterile instruments between tissues and between pigs. Non-
challenged age-matched negative control pigs were necropsied at
7 dpi (n=5 pigs).
The tissues were tested for virus by a real-time RT-PCR (qRT-
PCR) specific for the pandemic H1N1 matrix gene (Lorusso,
submitted) and virus isolation on Madin Darby Canine Kidney
(MDCK) cells. Briefly, approximately 500 mg of tissue was
homogenized in sterile phosphate buffered saline (PBS) with
antibiotics using a power homogenizer with sterile generators at
20% w/v. The MagMax Microarray (Ambion) protocol for RNA
extraction from tissues was followed using 100 mL of tissue
homogenate. The MagMax Viral RNA Isolation (Ambion) kit
protocol was used as per manufacturer’s instructions for serum by
adding 50 mL to the MagMax plate for RNA extraction. Viral
RNA samples were tested in duplicate by qRT-PCR.
For virus isolation, 200 mL of the tissue homogenate or serum
sample was placed on confluent MDCK cells in 24-well plates to
incubate for 1 hr. After 1 hr of incubation the sample was
removed and 400 mL MEM w/TPCK trypsin was added. The
plate was checked at 24 and 48 hrs for cytopathic effects. After
48 hrs, 200 mL of cell culture supernatant from each well of the
24-well plate after one freeze and thaw cycle was subsequently
passed onto a confluent 48 well plate. After 48 hrs, evidence of
cytopathic effects was evaluated and presence of virus antigen
confirmed by immuno-cytochemical staining. Virus titers in virus
isolation positive tissue homogenates were determined on MDCK
cells in 96-well plates.
Results
Influenza virus was isolated from the lung tissue of all pigs
euthanized on 3 and 5 dpi, and from the tonsil tissue of 1 pig in
each virus challenge group (Table 1). The mean virus titers for
lung tissue homogenates from pigs infected with CA/09 were 10
4.0
and 10
2.8 TCID50 per mL for days 3 and 5 pi, respectively. The
mean virus titers for lung tissue homogenates from pigs infected
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3.9 and 10
3.1 TCID50 per mL for days 3 and
5 pi, respectively. The tonsil samples were below sensitivity limits
of titration. The positive lung tissue was consistent with virus
isolation from broncho-alveolar lavage fluid (BALF) (data not
shown). All pigs were positive in BALF by virus isolation on days 3
and 5 pi, but negative on 7 dpi as demonstrated in the lung tissue.
Influenza viral nucleic acid was detected by qRT-PCR in all of the
20 virus-positive lung tissues but from neither of the virus isolation
positive tonsil samples (Table 2). In addition, viral nucleic acid was
detected in the lung samples of all pigs at 7 dpi as well as one
lymph node sample at 3 dpi, but these samples were virus isolation
negative. The mean copy numbers by qRT-PCR for lung tissue




3.3 for days 3, 5, and 7 pi, respectively. The mean copy numbers




2.7 for days 3, 5, and 7 pi, respectively. The copy number of
the positive lymph node sample was 10
2.4. No infectious virus or
viral nucleic acid was detected in any of the remaining tissue
samples from any of the virus challenge pigs or from any of the
negative control pigs. qRT-PCR was more sensitive for viral RNA
in the lungs at 7 dpi, at which time the pigs were recovering
clinically and viral shedding was declining. Importantly, qRT-
PCR did not detect viral RNA in any internal organs or muscle
tissue samples.
Clinical disease was induced in all infected pigs and will be
reported elsewhere in detail (Vincent, unpublished). Infectious
virus was detected in lungs from all experimentally infected pigs
necropsied on 3 and 5 dpi, confirming infection for both CA/09
and MX/09. These observations are consistent with what has
been reported with German and British experiments in which
clinical disease was induced and infectious virus and viral nucleic
acid could be detected in tissue samples associated with the
respiratory tract [3,4]. Neither infectious virus nor viral nucleic
acid was detected in plasma samples collected on days 21 through
7 dpi [4]. Except for plasma collected from pigs in the British
experiment, no other non-respiratory tract tissues were reported to
have been tested for virus.
Discussion
Experimental infections of swine with the pandemic H1N1 virus
have described a clinical disease where pigs develop pyrexia,
anorexia, and dyspnea within several days following challenge
[3,4] that is similar to what has been reported in endemic swine
influenza virus experiments. Likewise, there have been reports of
swine becoming infected in the field with the pandemic H1N1
virus in which the pigs displayed mild respiratory disease (http://
www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm). In these cases it is believed that
the pigs became infected following contact with infected people.
Collectively, this data suggests the pandemic H1N1 virus replicates
in swine and produces clinical illness that is indistinguishable from
typical swine influenza virus.
In contrast to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infections
in poultry [5], existing evidence suggests that swine influenza virus
does not induce a systemic infection contaminating the meat,
although there is limited data to support this assumption. To the
authors’ knowledge there are only two reports that describe an
infrequent viremia in pigs during the acute phase of the infection
with swine influenza virus [6,7]. One of these papers also describes
sporadic isolation of influenza virus from ‘‘other tissues such as
intestine and muscle and from faeces,’’ however, the methodology
is not well described and it is unclear during the acute infection
which tissues were positive at which times [7]. PCR was not
utilized in these studies and it is unknown if tissues would have
Table 1. Presence of pandemic H1N1 influenza virus by virus isolation in samples collected at 3, 5, and 7 days post infection (dpi).
*
Day Virus Lung Tonsil LN Serum Spleen Liver Kidney Feces Muscle
3 dpi CA/09 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M X / 0 9 5 10000000
5 dpi CA/09 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M X / 0 9 5 00000000
7 dpi CA/09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M X / 0 9 0 00000000
*15 pigs were infected with either the A/CA/04/2009 (CA/09) or A/Mexico/4108/2009 (MX/09) pandemic H1N1 virus isolates. Number of pigs positive out of 5 is reported
from each group euthanized on 3, 5, or 7 dpi; LN=inguinal lymph node tissue sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008367.t001
Table 2. Presence of pandemic H1N1 influenza virus by qRT-PCR in samples collected at 3, 5, and 7 days post infection (dpi).
*
Day Virus Lung Tonsil LN Serum Spleen Liver Kidney Feces Muscle
3 dpi CA/09 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M X / 0 9 5 0100000 0
5 dpi CA/09 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M X / 0 9 5 0000000 0
7 dpi CA/09 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M X / 0 9 5 0000000 0
*15 pigs were infected with either the A/CA/04/2009 (CA/09) or A/Mexico/4108/2009 (MX/09) pandemic H1N1 virus isolates. Number of pigs positive out of 5 is reported
from each group euthanized on 3, 5, or 7 dpi; LN=inguinal lymph node tissue sample.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008367.t002
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pathogenic avian influenza virus induced minimal disease with no
evidence for a systemic infection based on virus isolation and PCR
[8]. Similarly, infection of swine with the 1918 Spanish flu virus
resulted in minimal pulmonary disease with no virus being isolated
from a variety of non-respiratory tissues [9].
In this study, tissues outside the respiratory tract were found to
be negative by virus isolation on days 3, 5 and 7 pi for both isolates
of 2009 pandemic H1N1 evaluated. Only lung and tonsil samples
from days 3 and 5 pi were positive by virus isolation. In addition,
7 dpi lung samples and inguinal lymph node from one pig were
positive for viral RNA, but were negative by virus isolation. This
may be due to the increased sensitivity of the qRT-PCR in
detecting viral RNA over the sensitivity of detecting viable virus by
tissue culture techniques. By 7 dpi, viable virus is typically cleared
from the lung in pigs with uncomplicated infection with influenza
A virus, including 2009 pandemic H1N1 (Vincent, unpublished),
thus the viral RNA is likely remains following activation of the host
innate immune response. Two virus isolation positive tonsil
samples were found to be negative by qRT-PCR. This is likely
due to the low quantity of viable virus and/or viral RNA being at
the threshold of sensitivity for both assays.
In summary, the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus can induce
respiratory disease in swine that is consistent with influenza illness.
However, there was no evidence for systemic infection that would
contaminate meat with infectious virus. It is important to note that
ill swine would not be allowed entry into the U.S. food supply as per
USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service criteria. However, the
findings reported in this study support the WHO recommendation
that pork harvested from 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1
infected swine would be safe to consume when following standard
meat hygiene practices (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
statements/2009/h1n1_20090430/en/index.html).
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